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Abstract: I argue that something more is at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with science than  a mere 
dialectic with another discipline. This is because his methodological commitments end up positioning science as a 
special resource for pursuing deep ontological concerns that increasingly haunt his philosophy. I show this by 
connecting points in the Phenomenology’s “Phenomenal Field” chapter to his methodological challenge to the view 
that philosophy begins from a wholly active, autonomous, reflective consciousness. I link this to issues of passivity 
in a way that reveals science as a potential resource for grasping reflection not as autonomous, but as an operation of 
and within the phenomenal field—as radical reflection. Via critical analysis of recent results about the regulatory 
genome, I then show how current embryology can help us conceptualize life as a phenomenal field that implicitly 
engenders the sorts of revelatory operations distinctive of phenomenality. This lets us position phenomenology not 
merely as a reflection on phenomena from above, but as a radical reflection that operates through an ‘older’ 
phenomenality of life. This also give insights into some difficult issues in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy, by 
suggesting a new route to them through combining his earlier philosophy with recent science. 
 
 
An obvious and remarkable feature of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical work, from the 1942 
Structure of Behaviour (SB), through the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception (PhP), the child 
psychology lectures (1949-52), and on to his later lecture courses on institution and passivity (IP, 
1954-55) and nature (LN, 1955-56) is his continual engagement with science.2 What motivates 
his engagement with science and what is at stake in it?3 One well known motivation is 
methodological, namely his way of pursuing philosophical critique through dialectical 
engagement with other positions—including scientific positions. But I want to show how deeper 
issues are at stake, by indicating how the methodological motives that drive Merleau-Ponty to 
engage specifically with science (and not just, say philosophy or art) also end up positioning 
science as a special resource for pursuing the ontological issues that are his increasing concern. 
(Here and throughout, by science, I mean “natural science,” not the more expansive French 
“science” or German “Wissenschaft,” which would already include phenomenology, and thus 
throw off our question.) 
 To show this, the first section studies some points in the “Phenomenal Field,” a key yet 
often underplayed chapter and concept in the Phenomenology.4 This study connects his 
methodological motives for engaging science with his challenge to the view that philosophy 
begins from a wholly active, autonomous, reflective consciousness already constituted at a 
remove from its object and even from itself. Philosophy on the contrary entails what Merleau-
Ponty calls “radical reflection,” in which philosophical reflection is a joint operation of the 
reflector and the being the reflector reflects upon. (In VI this turns into the concept of “hyper-
reflection”.) I show how the phenomenal field chapter links radical reflection to issues of 
passivity5 that would in turn position science as a potential resource for grasping reflection not as 
autonomous, but as an operation of and within the phenomenal field—as radical reflection. (For 
clarity, I distinguish below between the reflector whose putative autonomy Merleau-Ponty 
challenges, and reflection as a joint operation of the reflector and being.)  
The science of Merleau-Ponty’s time, however, did not quite let him make this move of 
installing reflection in being via the phenomenal field. In the second section, I will show how 
recent embryology can in fact help us conceptualize life as a phenomenal field. That is, science 
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can help us encounter life as a field in which we find (implicitly) engendered the sorts of 
revelatory operations distinctive of phenomenality, such that phenomenology is not merely 
reflection on phenomena by a reflector from above, but operates through an ‘older’ 
phenomenality of life.6  
Since the ontological and conceptual innovations of The Visible and the Invisible are 
geared to this installation of reflection in being, and since his studies of embryology in various 
places in the lectures on institution and nature are contributory to these innovations, my 
procedure will give insight into some difficult issues in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy by 
suggesting a new route to them through combining his earlier philosophy with recent science—a 
route that Merleau-Ponty might have pursued had he lived long enough to encounter new 
discoveries in the life sciences. My procedure it also exposes science as a potentially deep 
resource for Merleau-Ponteian philosophy. 
 
1) From Radical Reflection to Science, via Passivity and the Phenomenal Field 
To appreciate what is methodologically and ontologically at stake in the “Phenomenal Field” 
chapter, let me first situate the Phenomenology within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project, 
and then situate the “Phenomenal Field” chapter within the project of the Phenomenology. 
Structure sets out to investigate the relations between nature and consciousness, so as to 
undo traditional dualisms. The problem is how to bring meaning and matter together. This is the 
problem of what Merleau-Ponty (in the Phenomenology) calls sense, a meaning that is 
inseparable from its bodily and material manifestation.7 In Structure Merleau-Ponty discovers 
sense in the phenomenon of structure, which entails the “joining of an idea and existence that are 
indiscernible.”8 Specifically, he discovers structures in the observable physical, organic and 
social world. A philosophy of living structure could thus undo the ontological dualism of nature 
and consciousness, since living structures are irreducibly material and meaningful. But Structure 
raises the question whether sense is in our experience of structures only, or is in structures 
themselves—whether structure as the location of sense is just an artefact of our cognition and 
therefore not a robust way out of ontological dualism. This question is what leads Merleau-Ponty 
to the project of the Phenomenology, which in effect tackles the problem of the location of sense, 
through a rigorous, phenomenological investigation of experience and the experiencer/reflector 
who perceives structure in things. If the Phenomenology can show that phenomenologically 
rigorous descriptions of experience themselves point to structure, as delineated by something 
beyond our constituting operations, something that engenders its own sense, then sense and 
structure can serve as a way into a non-dualist ontology.  
Notice the methodological issue here: if, in the Phenomenology, it is merely operations of 
the reflector that delineate sense and structure, then the problem of Structure remains. Indeed, it 
is the view of many scholars that the Phenomenology does not escape this problem (a point 
returned to below), or that, even worse, the Phenomenology’s turn to Husserlian subjectivity 
betrays the more radical sense that the Structure detected in living organisms as structures.9 This 
is why there is so much at stake, from the very start of the Phenomenology, in the concept of 
radical reflection: if the reflective operations that delineate structure are not merely operations of 
the lived, bodily subject, but operations in and of a deeper and broader phenomenal field, then 
there is hope of resolving Structure’s ontological problem. I want to show how the concept of the 
phenomenal field can, through attention to passivity and science, open a path to this sort of 
resolution.     
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To trace this path, and science’s role in it, I now turn to the preface of the Phenomenology, 
for this famously begins by insisting that a thoroughly rigorous science entails an analysis of the 
perceptual being through which alone one is in the world as a scientific knower. 
Methodologically, this sets things in motion toward the phenomenal field, by motivating a 
phenomenological analysis of the body as a key site and object of scientific knowing. The first 
three chapters of the introduction pursue this via a preliminary analysis that unfolds as a 
dialectical critique of science’s own claims about the body, anticipating the Phenomenology’s 
overall result that science is in fact rooted in a pre-reflective lived body and expressive tradition 
that is irreducible to a classic object of scientific reflection. This reinstalls scientific knowing in 
pre-reflective structures of being. The fourth and final introductory chapter, “The Phenomenal 
Field,” formalizes this reinstallation as a return to a phenomenal field. Fleshing out this return 
occupies the rest of the Phenomenology.  
Methodologically, the upshot of the introduction and its return to the phenomenal field is 
that concepts adequate to giving an account of ourselves and of scientific knowing must be 
responsible and adequate to what is revealed in the phenomenal field.  But we must remember 
that the challenge the phenomenal field poses to inadequate scientific concepts of the knower and 
the knower’s being also poses, for Merleau-Ponty, a challenge to inadequate philosophical 
concepts of the reflector—and thence to inadequate methodological conceptions of philosophy 
and phenomenology.  
This challenge is of profound consequence for the Phenomenology. First and most 
obviously, it deepens the theme of radical reflection that is first broached in the preface and then 
haunts the rest of the Phenomenology, since the challenge tells us that our concept of 
philosophical reflection must be adequate to a phenomenal field that is pre-reflectively given. 10 
(Indeed, it should be noted that the phenomenal field chapter pursues issues of radical reflection 
through a dialectic between the opposite errors of a Bergsonian intuitive coincidence between 
knowing and being, and an infinite separation of knowing and being in doctrines of “universal 
constituting consciousness”—the very same dialectic that drives VI to “hyper-reflection.”11) 
Second, rooting philosophy and reflection in a pre-reflective field of being anticipates deeper 
themes of the Phenomenology, for example, the pre-personal and perceptual learning and 
development, as leading to the result (in the “Sentir” chapter) that perception (and cognition) are 
rooted in an original past that has never been a present. Third, all of this leads to a key analysis 
of temporality that challenges any claim to a consciousness constituting temporality from 
‘outside’ of temporality. What is instead required is a “passive synthesis” that operates only via 
openness to processes that we do not ourselves constitute. (PhP 488-89/489-91/426-28)12 This 
point about passive synthesis puts a final nail in the coffin of a reflective consciousness that 
would operate actively and in autonomy from its object. Philosophy has to wait for its object, 
wait to become philosophy—and passively wait to do this from within an already given 
phenomenal field.    
What I want to emphasize, though, is that the issue of passivity (and waiting), to which the 
“Phenomenal Field” leads, in later chapters of the Phenomenology, is already there from the 
start, in the “Phenomenal Field” chapter itself. 13 And attending to passivity and its 
methodological and ontological implications from the start can let us see how science can serve 
as a special resource in returning to the phenomenal field. So let us now turn to a key passage of 
the phenomenal field chapter—and, I dare say, of the Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy:  
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Critical philosophy ultimately attaches no importance to this resistance of passivity, as if it were not 
necessary to become the transcendental subject in order to have the right to affirm it. It thus implies 
that the philosopher’s thought is not subjugated to any situation. … The center of philosophy is no 
longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity, situated everywhere and nowhere, but is rather 
found in the perpetual beginning of reflection at that point when an individual life begins to reflect 
upon itself. Reflection is only truly reflection if it does not carry itself outside of itself, if it knows 
itself as reflection-upon-an-unreflected, and consequently as a change in the structure of existence. 
(PhP 74-5/89-90/61-2, last emphasis Merleau-Ponty’s, initial emphasis mine.)  
This passage is striking in that it exactly sets up the key issue of the passivity lectures (and 
thence the institution lectures), namely that “every theory of perception” runs up against the 
problem of accounting for the fact that the perceiver can make sense of what is given, yet the 
perceiver does not posit or constitute the given. Consequently, “the explication of perceptual 
experience must make us acquainted with a genus of being with regard to which the subject is 
not sovereign, without yet the subject being inserted in it [e.g., reduced to it].”14 This genus of 
being, which resists yet makes sense to the subject, is precisely what is at stake in passive 
synthesis in the Phenomenology’s temporality chapter15 and even more in the “resistance of 
passivity” in the above passage. The problem with traditional conceptions of transcendental 
subjectivity is that they precisely forget that the “subject is not sovereign,” that we become 
transcendental subjects; they thus erroneously imply “that the philosopher’s thought is not 
subjugated to any situation”—that knowing is separate from being. In contrast, the phenomena 
lead Merleau-Ponty to conceive reflection as beginning at (and never completely escaping from) 
“that point when an individual life begins to reflect upon itself.”16 Reflection is thus not truly 
reflection if it gets carried away with itself and “carries itself outside of itself,” as if it could 
colonize all reality or subjugate it to reflective consciousness, as if philosophical reflection as 
such could already find itself operating as such outside of itself (as in a classic idealism, where 
ideas are carried outside of the subject), as if reflection did not rather depend on and arise out of 
its outside. Reflection must rather grasp itself as “reflection-upon-an-unreflected.”  
What’s at stake in the Phenomenology’s return to the phenomenal field is thus not merely 
finding the proper starting datum for phenomenology, but giving an account of phenomenology 
as an operation not merely of a reflective constituting consciousness, but of an unreflected to 
which it is passive. This is amplified in the sentences just prior to our passage, where he writes 
that reflection is not set up “in advance of the unreflected” but is rather a “creative operation that 
itself participates in the facticity of the unreflected,” which is why, Merleau-Ponty says, “only 
phenomenology speaks of a transcendental field.” Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on field here 
indicates that we are not speaking of a transcendental subject autonomous from facticity, but a 
subject given together with the field through which alone it operates, and to which, as the 
subsequent sentences make clear, the subject is passive. (PhP 74/88/61).   
That is, what’s innovative about phenomenology is that it takes the subject to be a function 
of a field.17 Knowing and being are a joint operation of one field, and so too is reflection. 
Reflection is thus radically responsible to its roots in an unreflected, such that reflection does not 
itself fully accomplish itself, but hinges upon an unreflected that the subject cannot subjugate, 
through which alone a life can become reflective. Yet, this unreflected is precisely what enables 
and indeed motivates reflection.18 Radical reflection is thus peculiarly passive vis-à-vis its 
unreflected: if it lost the resistance of passivity, it would fall back into being a reflector, a 
constituting consciousness—and all the skeptical and dualistic worries of Structure would be 
revived. Hence Merleau-Ponty’s motives for his later study of passivity, and his correlative 
interest in institution as a process that establishes new senses and meanings, not through 
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constitution, but through enduring something that motivates sense even though this something 
does not yet fully make or determinately have a sense.  
So far we’ve established that radical reflection operates in a phenomenal field wherein 
reflection is passive to an unreflected. But here a methodological complexity comes to the fore 
vis-à-vis conceptualizing radical reflection, namely that to do so we in turn need to conceptualize 
passivity with phenomenological rigour. How are we to do this? The problem is that we always 
encounter passivity as already mediated by our reflective activity and thus as already in principle 
subjugated to our reflective prejudices—which is why we tend to miss the “resistance of 
passivity” and end up prejudicially conceptualizing the subject as sovereign.  
This methodological issue is behind Merleau-Ponty’s insistence, in the passivity lectures,  
that rigorous conception of passivity entails a new genus of being that is unfamiliar to traditional 
philosophies. Traditional philosophies end up trying to conceptualize passivity as, for example, a 
dearth or absence of activity, rather than a new genus of being in its own right, a genus with its 
own resistance (not just resistance to us or to activity). Passivity is its own, positive phenomenon. 
This is why he tries to approach passivity through phenomena like sleep and the unconscious—
phenomena in which we are taken over by something that undoes our activity and active 
reflection, and does this undoing in its own terms. And yet, precisely because sleep and the 
unconscious undo reflective activity—and thence undo our ability to reflect on this undoing from 
within our own first person activity in the moment of their happening—to get at sleep or the 
unconscious as exemplary of passivity we need to do something like observe what goes on in 
others with regard to sleep or the unconscious, or wait whilst we go in and out of sleep, and then 
appeal to passively eruptive revenant memories of this going in and out of sleep. That is, to gain 
a phenomenological edge on passivity, we have to abandon our pretence to being wholly active 
reflectors dissociated from the phenomena, and instead realize that on a very deep level, what it 
is that we are trying to observe is something that we have to wait for and that carries us along in 
observing. We have to go passive and go outside our limits to encounter passivity. We have to 
wait for it.  
Now this is what natural science is good at: in science you have to wait to observe what 
makes sense, rather than making up your own mind about what makes sense in a seemingly 
spontaneous and autonomous act of reflection. Indeed, we can think of rigorous science as a kind 
of responsible passivity.19 Whereas philosophical reflection could end up being responsible all 
and only to our own interior activity, science tries to be responsible to something that it itself 
cannot generate. Of course, in experimental manipulations, science sometimes tries to hurry 
things along, but the experimental control, for example, is meant to counterbalance this, to let the 
phenomenon intrude on us in its own, unhurried time. This is all to say that science is a way to 
gain an edge on passivity, to open ourselves up, in a rigorous way (that would still need 
conceptual critique) to what is going on in being and our being, prior to reflection.   
Put another way, the phenomenal field names a pre-reflectively given domain in which 
reflection encounters phenomena that make sense, yet in such a way that what is given inherently 
emerges from and bears the legacy of operations beyond us, to which we are passive, even as we 
lend creativity to them, such that each phenomenon as it were says “I make sense to you, yet you 
did not fully constitute the sense that I make.” Vis-à-vis the phenomenal field, the problem with 
the traditional philosophy of reflection, which puts the reflector outside and above the field, is 
that it thinks the only sense there is comes from inside the reflector. The problem with traditional 
empiricist philosophy and traditional science is it says that there really is no sense. The issue of 
passivity indicates an integral hinging between the sense that I make and a sense that I cannot 
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have made, between the reflection and the unreflected. My contention is that science is perfectly 
positioned to study this hinge point, and indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology does study 
this hinge point through the science of the body. And yet, the science of Merleau-Ponty’s time, 
that he analyzes, keeps on eschewing sense.  
So, on the one hand, in the Phenomenology science does not succeed in returning us to the 
phenomenal field, since it fails to grasp that field as a field of sense and thence a field that is in 
and of itself (in advance of our reflective judgements and mental operations), phenomenal. And, 
on the other hand, if we were to stick with a criticism that Merleau-Ponty later makes of his own 
work20, the Phenomenology’s philosophy also does not ultimately succeed in returning us to the 
phenomenal field, since all it really does is convert a disembodied constituting consciousness 
into a lived-bodily constituting consciousness that generates the sense of things from within 
itself, without really running into the resistance of passivity in a phenomenal field beyond it. 
That is, all the Phenomenology really does is install the phenomenal field within the confines of 
the lived body as active constituter of sense and wholly active self-possession, versus installing 
the lived body inside a phenomenal field upon which and within which the lived body’s sense 
making operations depend.  
But this does not mean that science is of no use in returning to the phenomenal field, even 
if the science of Merleau-Ponty’s time cannot let him effect this return. Let us not forget that the 
Phenomenology’s return to the phenomenal field precisely starts out as a critique of scientific 
knowledge of the body, and this engagement with science shapes his return to the being of the 
lived body. Moreover, in pursuing this return Merleau-Ponty garbs the body with a fringe of 
habit and pre-personal operations, to which we are already passive. Further, by drawing on 
science, which approaches the body as a living system, he traces our lived body in relation to 
operations that we do not ourselves constitute, yet on which we depend and that sometimes erupt 
in our activity (as in sleep). By paying attention to that living fringe that erupts within 
experience, beyond the sense that we actively make, and showing how something more radical 
than the classic scientific conception would allow is at work there, we can step past the worry 
that the Phenomenology’s phenomenal field is merely the emperor of constituting consciousness 
in new clothes.21 Indeed, above I argued that the methodological issue that connects radical 
reflection to passivity positions science as a possible resource for showing how (within the 
phenomenal field) reflective knowing is inflected by and through unreflective being. This of 
course means that unreflective being (the new genus of being that he is seeking in the passivity 
lectures) is in fact already implicitly on the way to reflection, via a “creative operation that itself 
participates in the facticity of the unreflected”—unreflective being can engender sense. And here 
it is worth noting that right from the preface the Phenomenology operates via a remarkable 
interlacing of science and phenomenology. While the Structure drives Merleau-Ponty to take up 
a Husserlian phenomenology, and as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology begins as an 
effort to describe the unsurpassable foundations of science as rigorous knowledge, Merleau-
Ponty’s way of elucidating these foundations is very different: not simply through what 
philosophers say about science and scientists, but through what science says about science and 
scientists!  
That is, right from the start science, scientific testimony, and the natural being that science 
studies, participate in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the knower, as leading also to an 
ontology of a knower whose knowing is a function of a broader field. Science is thus a resource 
that Merleau-Ponty deploys in the Phenomenology as having a special role in returning to the 
phenomenal field—even if the Phenomenology might not fully succeed in this task.  
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Finally, I think this methodological linkage that I have traced, from the phenomenal field, 
through passivity, to science as a resource for returning to the phenomenal field, is at stake in a 
remark that Merleau-Ponty himself makes in an introduction on science and philosophy in part 
two of his first lecture on nature: 
How thus not to be interested in science in order to know what Nature is? If Nature is an all-
encompassing something [Englobant] we cannot think starting from concepts, let alone deductions, but 
we must rather think it starting from experience, and in particular, experience in its most regulated 
form—that is, science. (LN 122/87)22 
In his later texts, “nature” comes to designate being as phenomenon, as visible. Being, though, is 
more than just nature. Being includes its own endogenous invisible ‘depths,’ in virtue of which 
being has the latitude to engender the complex dynamic of nature as visible phenomenon, 
without nature being the manifestation of some essence behind the scenes, outside of nature, or 
even being a manifestation of abstract and already given universal laws, etc. (This ontological 
structure of manifestation is what’s at stake in Barbaras’s concept of phenomenality.) Merleau-
Ponty is in part interested in nature because a proper reading of nature as visible being can effect 
a reading or diagnosis of the ontological structure of being, that is endogenous in being, as the 
invisible of visible nature. (Something like this is at stake in his notion of a “psychoanalysis of 
nature”.23) In the passage above, though, Merleau-Ponty is reminding us that we are part of the 
very nature that we are trying to read, englobed by it. So our reading of nature is effected not 
through a reflective activity that spontaneously forges concepts and deductions from above 
nature, but by dint of nature itself. In other words, our reading of nature is passive to nature as a 
visible accessed through experience—even though our reading is also an activity. To read the 
ontology of nature we therefore need to plunge into experience. But the most rigorous way to do 
this is to plunge into experience in its most regulated form, which we find in science, wherein (I 
would say) responsible passivity exposes the sorts of moves that nature is already making of 
itself. This methodological point in the nature lectures is a reprise of the issue traced out above in 
terms of the phenomenal field, passivity, and science as a special resource for tracing the 
phenomenal field from within. But yet: science as ‘producing’ regulated experience tends to 
think it is doing the regulating, that it is ordering things, or that the ordering of things 
corresponds to ideal laws that make sense to us (or a divine mind)—versus a sense that arises out 
of nature itself, from below, a sense that we do not actively construct. 24    
Accordingly, what I am now going to do is show how more recent science can in fact help 
us get to the phenomenal field, as a field of operations beyond us, which engender its own sense, 
in advance of our reflection—by learning how to read life, via embryogenesis, as a phenomenal 
field that makes sense of itself. 
 
2) From Embryology and the Regulatory Genome, to Life as Phenomenal Field 
In his later lectures Merleau-Ponty himself turns to a study of embryogenesis to gain insights 
into the pre-personal genesis of sense in nature and being.25 By drawing on recent developmental 
biology, I want to show how we can advance this later project, but (for reasons discussed above) 
I do this in terms of the earlier concepts of structure and the phenomenal field.  
I pursue this project through an extremely compressed discussion of biologist Eric 
Davidson’s remarkable 2006 book The Regulatory Genome. Davidson synthesizes decades of 
research to show, in astounding detail, how animal26 embryogenesis can be explained in terms of 
a “regulatory genome.” I begin with a synopsis of Davidson’s result, gearing it to the claim I 
shall make about Davidson, starting on a large scale and then moving to finer grained detail.27 I 
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hasten to add that my aim is neither to dismiss nor belittle the truly astounding results achieved 
by Davidson (with a host of other scientists, technicians and computer programmers). However, 
scientific advances do not always accomplish the conceptual frameworks adequate to their 
findings. Philosophy can be an aid in sifting for such frameworks. And while I do not presume to 
have hit on a conceptual framework fully adequate to the findings, I nonetheless think there is 
something to be learnt from a critique of such concepts.  
Simply put, scientists mainly and typically want to say that the genes are doing the 
regulating of embryological development.28 Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, I argue that organisms 
are doing this regulating as structures that are not reducible to genetic networks, even though 
crucially articulated by them. This will lead to the concept of life as a phenomenal field, for once 
we grasp genetic regulation as structural in character we will see that it has what Merleau-Ponty 
would call an expressive ontology.      
As with prior embryologists, including Hans Driesch (who Merleau-Ponty studied), 
Davidson’s central problem is explaining how one totipotent cell develops into a highly 
differentiated and species-typical animal body—and can do so in face of perturbations. Such 
development according to type, despite perturbations, is said to be regulatory. Davidson’s basic 
claim is that regulation is achieved via a regulatory genome that amounts to a computer 
composed of hardwired genetic elements.29 The complex information processing capacity of this 
genomic computer is what explains development. Such processing, e.g., determines where, say, 
legs versus antennae are to grow. More, this processing capacity, as inherently flexible in 
responding to changing inputs, explains development’s regulatory (robust) characteristic. 
In Merleau-Ponteian terms, such processing generates sense, since it determines, e.g., that 
this organ is to be a leg, not an antenna, and that the leg is to go here, not there: it determines 
differences that make a difference to and within the material process of the organism, where 
these differences and the difference they make are thus inseparable from material processes.30 
Further, as we shall see, this sense is determined according to standards themselves generated by 
the organism in the course of development (and evolution), rather than standards wholly fixed in 
advance of development.  
My claim is that the regulatory genome ought not be conceptualized as a computer, a finite 
state automaton. Instead, its operation is central to what I call a self-articulating, self-
transforming structure. This structure encompasses both the regulatory genome and the growing 
body in its environment.31 Think of Merleau-Ponty’s account (in SB) of the soap bubble as a 
structure shaping itself through its overall dynamic in its environment. The developing organism 
is like this bubble structure, but the regulatory genome at its core gives it a dynamic and 
recursively complex responsiveness, that enables both the determinate articulacy of 
developmental responses, and the means to transform this articulacy, by movement that is (on 
both developmental and evolutionary time scales) open to an environment beyond the 
organism.32  
That is, the regulatory genome does not specify an already fixed, overall growth process, as 
if development merely reads out steps of a fixed plan.33 The frog egg doesn’t grow directly into a 
frog, it first grows into a tadpole that only then can grow into a frog; the tadpole-body is 
ingredient in whatever we might call the ‘frog-plan’. In this sense, development operates 
recursively, by transforming prior plans to develop new plans, where, crucially, the plans in 
question are not abstract information, but actual bodies of organisms.  
In more detail, the regulatory genome is determinately responsive to: external signals; and 
internal genetic signals emitted by the regulatory genome itself, and transformed inside the 
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organism via growth and further responses of the regulatory genome. In responding to signals, 
the regulatory genome can modulate either growth processes or the production of signals. And, 
most important, it can produce or respond to signals that modulate the way the regulatory 
genome itself responds to and does all the above. Recursive development thus depends on a 
recursive operation of the regulatory genome: like a recursive function that takes its own output 
as its input,34 the regulatory genome’s output complexly depends on the different ways it works 
on itself, where this ‘working on itself’ is mediated by its real-time interactions with the 
environment. And these interactions are not merely information processing, but full-blown bio-
chemical processes of and within the body whose bounds allow such processes to occur in the 
first place.  
Put another way, the regulatory genome establishes and operates under what we might call 
different regimes of response, which themselves also mediate regime transitions. (Think of 
Socrates in the Republic showing how a regime, by its very own activity, determinately 
transitions into another sort of regime, e.g., oligarchy into democracy.) Computer scientists 
would call such ‘information processing regimes’ states. A finite state automaton, a classic 
computer, is a machine that responds to inputs in a manner determined by its current state—but 
in such a way that a possible response is switching into another state. The way the computer 
recursively acts on itself not only effects transitions between states, but modifies the way in 
which it transitions between states. (I.e., state transitions can also transition to new state 
transition tables.) This gives the computer its complex power.  
We are now prepared for the central conceptual issue. While Davidson acknowledges that 
the regulatory genome differs from classic digital computers, he nonetheless conceptualizes it as 
a computer and thence conceptualizes it as kin to a finite state automaton.35 On my view, the 
regulatory genome is, however, radically different because its state transitions are not 
accomplished purely by the regulatory genome itself. Rather, the timing and orchestration of 
state transitions is mediated by the very growth that the regulatory genome itself orchestrates. 
Something outside the regulatory genome, namely the physics36 and biochemistry of the 
organism’s environmentally embedded growth (as well as dynamics and genomics inherited 
from the organism’s ancestors37), is thus internal to the genome’s recursion upon itself and the 
orchestration of state transitions. Andy Clark and others38 argue that the mind extends into 
‘external’ note pads on which we write things down, as Heidegger had already shown. My point 
is that the growing body itself serves as a crucial ‘scratch pad’ on which the regulatory genome 
‘writes down’ its current state; more, the very growth that the genome regulates inherently 
transforms this ‘scratch pad’ in ways crucial to orchestrating the regulatory genome’s 
operations.39 Indeed, even Davidson notes that if the regulatory genome is a computer, it is a 
massively distributed, parallel computer, with a copy in each cell of the growing organism. This 
is a computer that grows.40 I add that this growth substantively modifies the very architecture of 
the ‘computer,’ in ways crucial to what it does.    
Put in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, development is not a matter of a central ‘machine’, the 
regulatory genome, responding to inputs from outside. Rather, it is the environmentally 
embedded self-transformation of one overall structure. This structure comprises the regulatory 
genome and the organism’s growing body. This structure, though, differs from a soap bubble, in 
that its dynamic responsiveness is not a matter of a continuum of responses determined by mere 
physics. Rather, it enacts a restricted set of responses, those mediated by the regulatory 
network,41 and these responses are, moreover, determined by different growth regimes that 
themselves order one another. This is a highly articulate ‘bubble’, and we can think of its 
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different growth regimes as together generating the organism’s norm, to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
term. Indeed, the regulatory genome’s establishing and switching of states enables what the 
geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky called a norm of reaction, a highly complex way of at once 
reacting to the developmental environment whilst maintaining a norm in face of perturbation.  
This structural articulacy leads me to my concept of a self-articulating/transforming 
structure. The developing organism is not a mere machine, with parts operating outside of parts, 
it is a structure in the Merleau-Ponteian sense. Nonetheless, in virtue of the regulatory genome’s 
operation, this structure is internally, complexly, dynamically, and recursively articulate. This 
articulacy is key to developmental regulation, and exceeds any fixed set of finite states, since the 
articulacy in question can re-articulate itself, producing a new set of finite states, or giving these 
states new, living meaning. Thus my concept of a self-articulating/transforming structure, 
wherein the self-articulation of the structure can lead to its transformation into a new articulatory 
structure, and self-transformation proceeds through new ways of articulating the system, such 
that the engendering of sense is always passive to yet transformative of material processes and 
articulatory legacies. That is, what we have here is a system that we could never think of as 
autonomously constituting its sense, since sense production is always a labour that operates 
through inherited legacies that at the same time enable new senses to develop. To get at this 
difficult point, which would be hard to fully unpack here, let me turn to Husserlian concepts: the 
regulatory genome determines something kin to a horizon structure of articulate potentialities; 
but this horizon structure is internally complex, and recursively modifies itself, switching in new 
sub-horizonal structures.42 Yet, how this switching actually proceeds is precisely not fully 
determined inside the horizon itself. It is open to an outside (to material and energy flows) and to 
time—but not the time of subjectivity, rather a time going back to the material and dynamics of 
the parent organism, to the species-time of evolution, and to prior plan-bodies (e.g., the tadpole-
body) that orchestrate development. Note that this notion of horizon structures susceptible of 
recursive modification through exposure to time and outside inputs, gives a pre-cursor of the 
delicate balancing act that Merleau-Ponty traced with regard to reflection as arising “at that point 
when an individual life beings to reflect upon itself,” since the point is that self-articulation and 
transformation is always passive to an outside.  
Indeed, what we have here is something of an anticipation of a central point of the 
Phenomenology’s temporality chapter, which argues that the synthesis of temporality operates 
only as passive to the very flow that it synthesizes. We are seeing that development is not a 
genetic program in control of unfolding itself, but instead is open and passive to already-given 
plan-bodies and environments that enable and orchestrate the genetically regulated flows through 
which growth occurs and the body literally synthesizes itself.43 So, given that philosophical 
reflection is accomplished in lived bodies that are born and develop, what we are getting here is 
powerful testimony, from outside of reflective experience, that reflection is engendered out of a 
passivity that goes deep into life and nature. Indeed, we could put the above in terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s key image of passivity, sleep: frog development, as needing to inherit the tadpole-body 
as plan and legacy, involves something kin to the frog-as-growth-agent going to sleep, passively 
handing itself over to the tadpole-body, to wake up only when the tadpole-body has finished its 
growth, and started ‘growing froggy’. This image, though, artificial divides tadpole growth and 
frog growth—but just as much as our discussion of sleep artificially divides the sleeper from the 
one awake. It is only because the two are mixed yet immiscible that one can wake or be called to 
wake from sleep. 
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But let us return to more basic issues that further highlight a passivity and, more important, 
an expressivity endogenous to sense-generation. It follows from the above that the sense 
generated in development by the self-articulating/transforming structure is not already contained, 
even in implicitly determinate form, in the fertilized egg. The egg is what can generate the sense 
of the adult organism, can make sense of itself, but it cannot do this from within itself, 
autonomously. Whatever determinate indeterminacy the regulatory genome has, this does not yet 
suffice to engender the organism. This engendering requires factors beyond the genome, most of 
all the growing body as organizing, orchestrating and ‘drawing out’ this determinate 
indeterminacy. And this engendering can happen in different ways, even if tending to the species 
typical.  
This means, though, that growth is a process that exhibits the peculiar logic of expression 
so central to Merleau-Ponty. In this logic, the result of expression is not yet determinately 
contained as such in the beginning of the expressive process, since the result does not resemble 
this beginning. Yet, on the other hand, the result is not independent of what was there in the 
beginning. Sense is engendered, but not by unpacking a pre-formed sense. As Merleau-Ponty 
would put it, in cases of what he calls primary, creative, (human) expression, I do not know what 
I want to say until I figure out how to express it. What I want to express is thus not yet there at 
the beginning of expression; nonetheless, when I do figure out what I want to say, I realize this 
was what I wanted to express all along.44 Husserl’s horizons are once again helpful: it is 
precisely because the horizon of primary expression is open and indeterminate that it can yield a 
creative sense, an X that I did not yet know how to say; yet, this indeterminacy is a determinate 
indeterminacy, since it is precisely this determinate X that I did not yet know how to say.  
As Bernhard Waldenfels notes (2000), for Merleau-Ponty primary expression is thus a 
peculiar kind of translation that creates the original text that it translates. We can see this in the 
regulatory genome: it operates in such a way that it produces the transcription products that serve 
as signals that sequence state transitions; the regulatory genome’s ‘task’ is thus not to unfold a 
pre-formed plan, but to, in the first place, continually produce, in situ, the ‘plan’ that can then be 
translated into the adult animal (for example, the tadpole-body as crucial to the growing 
organism translating itself into the ‘frog-plan’). To put it in terms closer to Davidson, he points 
out that the regulatory genome differs from ordinary computers since there is no real division 
between hardware and software; the regulatory genome’s operation is such that it is always 
‘reprogramming’ itself. The genome is thus translated (its ‘programming’ turns ‘hardwired code’ 
into actual genetic signals) in such a way that this very translation creates, via modulation, the 
original text (the programming, orchestrating signals and context) that ends up being translated. 
Although we can conceptualize the frog genome as already ‘containing the genetic text’ for a 
frog-body, this is not the way things actually work. It is only by way of the frog-egg (in its 
environment) translating itself, via its genetic material, into a tadpole-body that this ‘original 
genetic text’ actually becomes translatable into a frog-body. Or better, since we would have to 
‘fractally’ interpolate a host of smaller versions of this point, we find that the ‘translation’ is 
inseparable from the very growth of what it is that does the translating. The ‘text’ is not already 
there, except in a sort of ‘ur-text’ whose translation in fact re-splices and differently transcribes 
it, to produce the ‘text’ in the first place, in a complexly dynamic recursive process, that is, 
moreover, modulated by the dynamics of bodily growth. Hence the expressive characteristic of 
this process: it is kin to a process in which someone says something not by already being able to 
say it, but only by becoming the practitioner of language who is then able to say it. In so far as 
the developmental plasticity endogenous to such processes plays out as typical, we have 
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something kin to secondary expression; insofar as such plasticity inherently enables deviation 
from the typical, and inherently enables cleavage to type through atypical routes, either on the 
individual or evolutionary timescales, we have something kin to primary expression.  
Put another way, Leonard Lawlor (1998, 22) observes that Merleau-Ponty’s paradox of 
expression is kin to Deleuze’s, in that the “‘the expressed’ does not exist outside of the 
expression and yet bears no resemblance to it.” Here we can observe something striking: 
organismic development perfectly captures this paradoxical logic. The adult organism does not 
really resemble the egg from which it grows, yet the adult clearly does not exist outside or 
independent of the egg or its growth. The adult is the egg become different, yet this becoming 
different, we are now seeing, is not by way of resemblance, not even an invisible resemblance, 
since the adult organism is not the unpacking of a pre-formed plan, but rather the generation of a 
plan on site, through time.  
On the basis of this analysis, we can see that a self-articulating/transforming structure is 
expressive. Whereas a soap bubble is always going to resemble itself in its response to the 
environment, because its structure is invariant, in organisms we have a virtual norm that is not 
given as such at the beginning, but becomes express.  
At this point I want to dip into a bit more detail about how the regulatory genome actually 
works. Davidson shows how we can conceptualize the animal’s DNA as containing, amongst 
other things, regulatory modules. Each such module has sites that, when transcribed, produce 
genetic signals or components of the organism. But the modules also have other sites where 
genetic signals can attach. These attachments can modulate production of signals, and thence 
modulate other sites, via intermediary genetic signals. Each module can be conceptualized as a 
set of logic gates, some scalar, some binary. Significantly, these gates can work in a combinatory 
way, and modules combine in networks. For example, C outputs a signal only if signals a and b 
are both present, with C’s output being suppressed by E if d is present. Indeed, the logic of these 
modular networks can be represented in the form of a computer program. 
These details are worth mentioning because, in a way, Davidson perhaps suggests a 
solution to a problem that Merleau-Ponty addressed in his studies of embryology in the nature 
and institution lectures. There, as always, Merleau-Ponty was looking for a way to the 
phenomena and to sense, between empiricism and idealism, materialism and idealism. 
Specifically, his critical analysis, which I cannot rehearse here, led him to seek a way to account 
for the regulatory character of embryos, which Driesch had discovered, but without succumbing 
to Driesch’s vitalist appeal to an immaterial, “metaspatial” “entelechy,” or to a materialist 
account that would somehow reduce the organism’s plan into atomized bits, or a spatial 
ensemble thereof. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis turns on a dialectic between the metaspatial and 
spatial, which leads Merleau-Ponty to something “transpatial,” which he hints at in the institution 
lectures in terms of “triggers of “reaction,” “signals”: transspatial feedbacks” (IP 50/17) and in 
the nature lectures in terms of a “gap,” a negative in being, “encrusted between the [material] 
situation and the [developmental] response”—but where the transspatial cannot be located as 
something given in space. (LN 301/237) This is what I think Davidson is showing us: he is 
showing us how the material configuration of the regulatory genome is key to development, but 
(on my argument) not as something given here and now, spatially. The regulatory genome has 
this role only as part of a temporally and spatially open, distributed feedback structure that is yet-
to-be, via a kind of organismic différance. The regulatory genome only makes sense, a difference 
that makes a difference, when it repeats/recurs upon itself through differing and deferring from 
itself. What is interesting is that Davidson lets us see this ‘différance potential’ in a distribution 
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of molecules in a system. On the one hand, this gives us a way into grasping life as an exposure 
to passivity that can yet make sense, life as making sense through a sort of undoing of the 
concept of already given sense—which is at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s notions of passive 
synthesis, temporality, and institution. On the other hand, the temptation in science (and this is 
Davidson’s temptation) is to reduce this possibility of living sense-making to the informational 
content of the genome, in which case, vis-à-vis the larger questions at stake here, we’d end up 
with an informational/computationalist version of constituting consciousness, and lose the 
passivity that is at issue in the phenomenal field and Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology.  
Indeed, at this juncture we can precisely see the need for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological 
investigations, for while, as promised above, we can here see how engaging science 
methodologically enables a challenge to our all too active position as knowing reflectors, by 
showing how our bodily, evolved, developmental roots in being expose us to radical 
contingencies and temporality, we are in fact at a point where we are, in a way, repeating, albeit 
on a micro-scale, the problem at the hinge between Structure and the Phenomenology, namely 
whether the above reading is merely projecting reflective issues of structure, expression, etc. on 
to organisms. To head off this worry would require a demonstration that nature and living 
processes themselves can bear the ontological burden with which we have here saddled them. 
There is not enough room for this here, although I have a way to it that complements some issues 
about negativity, depth and genesis in the later Merleau-Ponty.45  
What is important, though, is that the sort of analysis given above gives finer grained 
definition to the problem, and a way into it through science that can temper the methodological 
dangers of conceptual ‘activism’, by having science, through its cultivation of the responsible 
passivity of observation, draw attention to the ways in which nature has to wait to be nature. 
Embryogenesis is not regulation wholly and fully actively under control by an inner genetic 
essence or regulatory computer, it turns on passivity. The frog cannot jump from being an egg 
into being a frog, without waiting for all the phases and moves between, which take time, 
exposure, openness—which is why rate and thence temperature and chemical inputs are so 
important in biological development. A computer program will play out exactly the same no 
matter how fast you run it (given inputs that can keep up), but if you speed up or slow down 
living growth you can get something different. The difference between sexes in alligators 
depends on temperature of egg incubation, not genes; the queen bee’s phenotype is determined 
not by inner genes merely, but by the royal jelly playing on these genes through the ingesting 
body. 
Development is in this respect passive synthesis made flesh. It is an active operation that 
yet turns on something beyond itself to which it is passive. In this way, a science of development 
can give us an insight into how a phenomenal field can arise wherein passivity to something not 
yet organized (and thus resistant to reflective analysis) can turn into something organized 
(amenable to reflective analysis and even capable of reflection). Indeed, such science shows how 
in the case of life the organized necessarily turns to and out of the as yet unorganized.46 It thus 
shows us something about the deep phenomenology and ontology of the hinge between 
reflection and the unreflected, which hinge is at stake in radical reflection and hyper-reflection, 
at the “point when an individual life begins to reflect upon itself,” without yet being sovereign 
vis-à-vis what it reflects upon. Methodologically, it crucially shows us this not from within our 
own active reflection, but in the pre-reflective movements of life—through a responsible 
passivity to nature.  
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This result is relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy, for it suggests how we could 
look to development for clues to the ontology of the visible and the invisible. For what we have 
observed is that organisms, in their development, do not reflect invisible ‘essences’, but rather 
what Merleau-Ponty would call the invisible of the visible, via what Barbaras designates 
phenomenality (see above). And we can now glean how this invisible is right there within the 
visible: it is not an essence, it is rather an invisible of generativity, what I called above a 
‘différance potential’. This sort of generativity is invisible in that it has not yet fallen into a 
specific, determinate visibility—or even a determinate, visible potentiality. It is not yet 
determinately visible because the generativity as stake here is inherently mutable—because 
inherently passive. In fact its mutability is the mutability of temporality, and its invisibility is the 
invisibility of temporality (which is what Merleau-Ponty was opening up in the 
Phenomenology’s study of temporality). But the case of development would show us how this 
invisibility of temporality shows up, as paradoxically invisible right there in the visible, only 
when temporality makes a difference in, is passive to, a material system—and this will require 
boundaries and place, a kind of space-like complement to temporal passivity. But this is a topic 
for another paper.  
So let me conclude by returning to the phenomenal field. For what has been shown above is 
that life exhibits a sense that is engendered within a field, out of something that does not yet 
already contain the sense that will be engendered, yet without which sense could not have been 
engendered. (The egg doesn’t already contain the sense of the frog, but without the egg, no frog.) 
Since we ourselves are living, and thus grow and develop, it is empirically and unsurpassably the 
case that our experience arises within such a life-field of sense. Indeed we can see that legacies 
of this sense generation, legacies of our living growth and development, concretely inform the 
world of sense in which we live (without yet fully determining the sense of our world, as this 
sense is taken up in individual, cultural and historical institutions). In this respect the field of life 
is an unsurpassable and transcendental field from which phenomenological reflection begins. 
Life is the first and deepest form of the phenomenal field, the oldest institution of sense.47 And 
philosophical reflection, as unsurpassably arising from and within life as phenomenal field, thus 
entails a radical- or hyper- reflection that is (passively) responsible to its roots in life as 
phenomenal field, a hyper-reflection that traces how it is that philosophy arises out of ‘older’ 
operations. But this would demand of us a new ontology that can find sense in the flesh of 
nature. The thought here is that we can begin reading this new ontology through development. 
1 I would like to thank Shiloh Whitney, Noah Moss Brender, Donald Beith, Lisa Guenther,  
Tristana Martin Rubio and Don Landes for their invaluable contributions to my understanding of 
Merleau-Ponty on institution, passivity and nature. I also thank Dan Landreville for further 
insights on passivity and discussions of the relations between the passivity lectures and the 
Phenomenology. I would especially like to acknowledge Noah Moss Brender’s crucial, critical 
and editorial comments on an initial draft of this paper, and acknowledge his careful work on 
organisms and Merleau-Ponty as of continual interest and inspiration. 
2 Merleau-Ponty’s works are cited by the abbreviations indicated in the text, followed by page 
numbers in the French and then English editions. The exception is PhP, which is cited by page in 
the original, pre-2008, Gallimard edition; then page in the 2008 Gallimard; then page in the 
original English, pre-2002, edition. The translation of PhP quoted here is the 2012 translation by 
Donald A. Landes, which includes the 2008 Gallimard pagination in the margins.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Saint Aubert (2006), chapter III, §4 gives a helpful textual analysis of some of the places where 
Merleau-Ponty himself avows points about philosophy’s relation to science. My effort here is 
more to discuss Merleau-Ponty’s relation to science by tracing and reconstructing how he 
actually positions science in relation to his method and the workings of his philosophy—and also 
to discuss what he could have done. For some other studies of issues around Merleau-Ponty and 
science that are helpful background, see Toadvine (1999), De Beistegui (2005), Holland (2002), 
Robert (2006). 
4 E.g., Toadvine (2008) gives a nice summary of the methodological issue that is of interest here, 
namely the way in which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology turns, through radical reflection, into 
his later “hyper-reflection.” But this is mostly worked out through PhP’s preface, missing 
stronger anticipations of VI and hyper-reflection in the phenomenal field concept. Similarly, the 
issue at hand is implicit in the astute reflections on phenomenological beginnings in Sallis 
(1973), but there too the phenomenal field is bypassed. Lawlor (1998), on the other hand, does 
notice something quite radical in the notion of the phenomenal field. Although its centrality is 
not treated directly, the phenomenal field figures in the study of expression in Kristensen (2010) 
in a way that flags some of the issues discussed below.  
5 The methodological worry that our philosophical activity, as all too constitutive of its object, 
might throw phenomenology off track hovers over IP, this paper, and Merleau-Ponty’s project in 
general. For helpful papers on this topic, see Heinamaa (1999), (2002). Also see Morris (2005). 
For a different approach to this sort of issue in Merleau-Ponty see Alloa (2008).  
6 Note that an activity of reflection is, however, requisite to explicitly exposing the significance 
of these revelatory operations for phenomenology. The issue flagged here, about the relation 
between phenomenology and life, and the notion of phenomenality—of phenomena not as the 
showing of something else, but rather as being’s show of itself through a distance within itself 
that is exemplified by living movement and desire—are central to Barbaras’s work, which is 
constantly in the background of the thinking in this paper.  
7 For discussion of sense and expression in Merleau-Ponty, see, e.g., Hass (1999), (2008), 
Lawlor (1998), Kristensen (2010) and Morris (2004), (2011). 
8 SB 223/206. The full formula specifies that structure is the “joining of an idea and existence 
that are indiscernible, the contingent arrangement by which the materials placed before us begin 
to have a sense, intelligibility in the nascent state.” Again, compare this to the issues at stake in 
the phenomenal field as reflection-upon-an-unreflected and the linkages between structure and 
phenomenal field cited in note 16. This suggests that in some sense the phenomenal field concept 
is a phenomenologically transformed version of the structure concept, which point does not go 
unnoticed, e.g., in Tiemersma (1987). This would suggest a closer proximity between Structure 
and Phenomenology than Barbaras would allow (see next note).  
9 The issue of where structure is ontologically ‘located’ haunts SB and is at stake in its 
concluding chapter; it shapes Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenological 
method in PhP. There is controversy, though, especially prominent in the work of Barbaras, 
whether the PhP then betrays the project of SB, namely finding sense at work in observable life 
around us. I am precisely trying to show that on the contrary, PhP maintains this issue, and could 
have recuperated it through an engagement with science. It’s just that the science at Merleau-
Ponty’s time wasn’t enough to let him make this move. 
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10 For key passages on radical reflection, see PhP ix/14/xv; 253-6/263-7/219-222; and 459-
61/456-59/398-400. The latter gives a formula for radical reflection that links it to temporal 
thickness and thence passivity, since the analysis ends with the question how “subjectivity can be 
simultaneously dependent and indeclinable,” i.e., inserted, as per below, in a phenomenal field.  
11 This dialectic becomes especially clear in the opening sentences of “The Intertwining—The 
Chiasm” chapter, which helps emphasize that the chapters on “Interrogation and Dialectic” and 
“Interrogation and Intuition” function as a dialectic that points out the shared error of Sartre’s 
negative consciousness as reflective on and infinitely distant from its object, and Bergson’s 
intuitive consciousness as coincident with its object.  
12 These passages on passive synthesis must be compared with the passages on the resistance of 
passivity cited below from the phenomenal field chapter, for in discussing passive synthesis 
Merleau-Ponty writes that “What we call passivity is not our reception of an external reality or of 
the causal action of the outside upon us: it is being encompassed, a situated being—prior to 
which we do not exist—that we perpetually start over and that is constitutive of us. … [W]e are 
entirely active and entirely passive because we are the sudden upsurge of time.” (On this “being 
encompassed”, cf. the Englobant in the passage from LN, on science as regulated form of 
experience, discussed below.) 
13 I would especially like to thank Dan Landreville for her insights about passivity and the 
relation between PhP and IP in our various discussions of this topic, in particular for 
emphasizing the importance of passivity in the phenomenal field chapter.  
14 I am here quoting from Merleau-Ponty’s course summary of the passivity lectures, IP 267/206. 
15 See note 12. 
16 The language and thinking here are strikingly similar to the passage in SB (175/162) where 
Merleau-Ponty, thinking about Hegel’s philosophy of nature through Hyppolite, speaks of life 
and thence the concept as arising only “when a piece of extension, by the disposition of its 
movements and by the allusion that each movement makes to all the others, turned back upon 
itself and began to express something, to manifest an interior being externally.” This passage is 
worth citing not only because it anticipates issues of expression as an interior operative only 
through its exterior, which issues are key to the concept of the phenomenal field, but because the 
sort of logic of life at stake here is precisely what the study of embryology lets us trace in more 
detail. 
17 This issue is explored in various ways in Tiemersma (1987), but the focus there is on Merleau-
Ponty’s relation to the notion of field in scientific domains such as Gestalt psychology, vs. the 
larger philosophical significance of this term for Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. 
18 This is why, close to the above passage, Merleau-Ponty says that phenomenology always ends 
up being a “phenomenology of phenomenology,” i.e., a study of how phenomenology arises, as a 
reflective project, in this field. 
19 This formula obviously brings phenomenology as science of experience, and natural science, 
into very close proximity. But developing this point would require another paper. 
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20 See, e.g., the famous “Dualism—Philosophy” note of July 1959 in VI, which many take as 
decisive. But see, e.g., Hass (2008) and the introduction to Toadvine (2009) for representatives 
of a ‘continuity view’ of Merleau-Ponty. 
21 A further question is whether some sort of engagement with a science of the living is 
necessary to resolving the problem of passivity; behind this is Barbaras’s challenging shift of 
phenomenology from classical subjective to living phenomena; part of what I want to suggest is 
that this shift is already at stake in and achievable by Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with science. 
22 My thanks to Noah Moss Brender for drawing this passage to my attention as complementary 
to points worked out in the initial draft. 
23 See the November 1960 note on nature in VI. 
24 This is a problem I tried to trace in a different way through a study of abduction in Morris 
(2005). 
25 Indeed, this paper would not have been possible without Merleau-Ponty’s studies of 
embryology and development, which, remarkably, show how development is in fact central to 
understanding the concepts of structure and totality as (in turn) central to the “idea of nature and 
maybe the whole of philosophy.” (LN  194/145) These studies of embryology are to be found in: 
LN, 187-203/139-152, 293-308/230-242; and IP 16-7/49-50. Basically put, Merleau-Ponty is 
showing how we ought study embryogenesis if we are concerned to rigorously formulate notions 
of development and sense genesis that are adequate to the phenomena, and show how this 
requires a new sort of ontology. Note that Merleau-Ponty’s studies of behaviour and behavioural 
development in the child may have contributed to his interest in embryology, since, e.g., Gesell 
(1971) argues that the development of cognitive behaviour and the development of the body are 
not two different things, which is also a theme central to Coghill’s work, and we know that both 
Coghill and Gesell are important to LN. 
26 Davidson’s focus is on bilateran animals. 
27 I have developed a detailed defense of the account below for another venue, but there is not 
enough room to do that here on this occasion. Leaving out the detail is troubling, for what is 
important and wondrous—perhaps Nobel-worthy—in Davidson’s account is the detail. On the 
other hand, I have not in any case, been able to master these details. Such mastery would take 
years of study and familiarity with a plethora of genes, developmental systems and so on.  
The discussion below is based on Davidson (2006), (2001), Istrail and Davidson (2005), 
Istrail, De-Leon and Davidson (2007), Yuh, Bolourie and Davidson (1998). 
28 But see, e.g., Fox Keller (2002), (2000a), (1995), (2005), Amundson (2005), and Wilson 
(2005) as examples of various philosophical challenges to the gene-centric or selfish-gene view. 
29 As Davidson puts it, a regulatory DNA sequence (the regulatory genome is composed of a 
multiplicity of such sequences) “amounts essentially to a hardwired biological computational 
device.” (Davidson (2006), 48) He is here speaking of the sequence that regulates transcription 
of the endo16 gene in the sea urchin. But he holds this sort of view in general of the regulatory 
genome. He writes of the genome as “a vast delocalized computer” (188); of evolution as 
“assembling endless varieties of the [genomic] computer” (240, with the “endless varieties” here 
perhaps being a nod to the famous closing passage of Darwin’s Origin); and a key point, is that 
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“the operation of the regulatory system can be symbolized, as in a computer program, by a series 
of conditional logic statements” (54), although in both (2006), Istrail and Davidson (2005), and 
Istrail, De-Leon and Davidson (2007) it becomes clear that the processing operation of this 
computer is different than that of an digital computer. What I am emphasizing is that this 
modular operation in fact depends, for its information processing efficacy, on a complex relation 
with its environment, which is the internal milieu of the growing body. See Fox Keller (2000b) 
for other critical reflections on Davidson’s conception of the regulatory genome as actually being 
an (analogue) computer, not just something that we can model as an analogue computer. 
30 The issue of leg placement is one of the issues that troubles Merleau-Ponty in IP, via his 
engagement with Ruyer. 
31 On the importance of the environment to development, see Weele (1999), Kirschner and 
Gerhart (2005), Wilson (2005). 
32 In speaking of response we would here run into questions of imputing agency, and so on; I 
here merely wish to use “response” to indicate that the products of genetic transcription are 
dependent on the presence of specific genetic products (and their modifications) in the cellular 
milieu. But see Wilson (2005) for reasons why we should be thinking about agency here. 
33 Cf. the point in Kirschner and Gerhart that what evolves in evolution are not so much 
organisms or blue prints for organisms, but ways of making organisms; correlatively, what the 
genome specifies are ways of making organisms, and nothing is fully specified by such 
specifications absent the making. This point that evolution reconfigures relations between 
conserved processes of organism construction (rather than coming up with new or modified 
‘blueprints’) is what gives evolution its efficacy in constructing viable organisms. Again, we 
might think here of the logic of determinately indeterminate horizons in Husserl. 
34 An example of such a recursive function is to be found in the following specification of the 
factorial function: 0! = 1; n! = n * (n - 1)! Given this definition, we calculate 2! as a function of 
1!, which is in turn a function of 0! There is a sort of internal nesting and sequencing of 
functions, like the egg ‘in’ the tadpole ‘in’ the frog.  
35 Istrail, De-Leon and Davidson (2007). 
36 For this point about the physics of growth mattering insofar as adhesional forces, diffusion 
patterns, etc., organize growth (and thence would mediate the distribution of genetic signals), see 
Goodwin (2001) and Forgács and Newman (2005).   
37 Jablonka and Lamb (2005). 
38 See Clark (1997), (2008), Clark and Chalmers (1998). 
39 Cf. the analogy that Wilson (2005) makes between externalist views of mind and his own 
critique of gene-centric views; I came across this after drawing my own analogy.  
40 See Istrail, De-Leon and Davidson (2007). 
41 One might want to say here that the set of responses is strictly finite, but this would already 
presume an information processing view of the regulatory network, that abstracts from its 
physics that renders signals inherently plastic, and in any case we must remember that the set of 
18 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
possible responses depends on maintenance of the organisms boundaries and internal 
transcription apparatus, etc. 
42 See esp. Husserl ([1931] 1991), §19. 
43 In this issue of openness and the phenomenal field, we are in effect seeing a new version of the 
problem of the Kantian imagination as requisite to bringing concepts and intuitions together in 
experience. On this connection see Morris (2008). 
44 See “The Body as Expression, and Speech” and Waldenfels (2000), Kristensen (2010) and 
Hass (2008) for helpful discussions. 
45 Around all of these issues, it is worth noting the explorations of a working note in VI 
(“Labyrinth of Ontology,” September 17, 1958) where he writes of the universe of meaning as 
repeating the universe of structure, and links these issues to question about a new concept of 
possibility that he explores by looking to salamander development for a clue to a new way to 
conceptualize possibility.  
46 But note that living beings in fact organize their surrounding environments, in ways that can 
be crucial to their physiological process, c.f., e.g. Turner (2000), Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman (2003), Baluška, Mancuso, Volkmann and Barlow (2004). 
47 One could object that a transcendental field could not be subject to empirical contingencies 
such as those of biology. But this would forget that when Husserl, especially in the Cartesian 
Meditations, pursues the transcendental field, he does not set out in advance for a transcendental 
constituting consciousness above the empirical fray, rather he precisely opens himself to the field 
of experience as empirically given, and this is what subsequently leads him to identify the 
transcendental ego as unsurpassable—and fully tracing this ego leads him to the monad, the Leib, 
the alter ego, and passive syntheses and a genetic phenomenology. 
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